

# Mistakes in Future Consumption, High MPCs Now<sup>\*</sup>

Chen Lian<sup>†</sup>

January 15, 2023

## Abstract

In a canonical intertemporal consumption model, future consumption mistakes (in response to saving changes) lead to higher current marginal propensities to consume (MPCs). These mistakes increase the value of changing current consumption relative to changing saving, as additional saving will not be spent optimally. Various behavioral biases can cause these mistakes, such as inattention, present bias, diagnostic expectations, and near-rationality (epsilon-mistakes). This result helps explain the empirical puzzle of high-liquidity consumers' high MPCs. In my approach, predictions of sophistication (anticipation of future mistakes) can be derived independently of the underlying biases.

**Keywords:** bounded rationality, intertemporal consumption, MPCs, sophistication

---

<sup>\*</sup>I am extremely grateful to Marios Angeletos, Alp Simsek, and Ricardo Caballero for continuous guidance throughout the project. I am grateful to Hassan Afrouzi (discussant), Nick Barberis, Corina Boar, Stefano Dellavigna, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Jonathon Hazell, Martin Holm, Cosmin Ilut, Pete Klenow, Julian Kozlowski, Yueran Ma, Emi Nakamura, Michaela Pagel, Jonathan Parker, Karthik Sastry, Benjamin Schoefer, Frank Schilbach, Jon Steinsson, Dmitry Taubinsky, Adam Szeidl, Joshua Schwartzstein, Andrei Shleifer, Ludwig Straub, Ivan Werning, Muhamet Yildiz, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at ASSA 2022, Berkeley, Berkeley-Chicago Behavioral Seminar, BI Norwegian Business School, China Star Tour, CICM 2021, Chicago Booth, Columbia, Duke, Duke Fuqua, MIT, Yale SOM, SED 2021, Stanford GSB for helpful comments and discussions. I am grateful to Bruno Smaniotto for excellent research assistance. I acknowledge the financial support from Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. This paper is a more general version of and replaces “Consumption with Imperfect Perception of Wealth.”

<sup>†</sup>UC Berkeley and NBER; chen\_lian@berkeley.edu.

# 1 Introduction

There is increasing consensus that behavioral biases play an important role in explaining consumption behavior. For example, recent evidence shows that consumers exhibit high marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) away from liquidity constraints (Parker, 2017; Kueng, 2018; Fagereng, Holm and Natvik, 2021).<sup>1</sup> It is hard for the canonical liquidity-constraints-based models to explain this evidence and it points toward behavioral explanations.

But it is unclear whether there are robust, consistent predictions on how behavioral biases impact MPCs. There are many potential behavioral biases in intertemporal consumption problems, such as inattention (Sims, 2003; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Gabaix, 2014, 2016), present bias (Laibson, 1997; Angeletos et al., 2001), mental accounting (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990), diagnostic expectations (Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo 2022), and imperfect problem solving (Ilut and Valchev, 2023). Economists face a challenge in selecting which behavioral biases to incorporate into the mainstream consumption model.

In this paper, I instead establish a high-MPC result independent of the exact behavioral bias. I show how anticipation of future mistakes in response to saving changes, i.e., sophistication, leads to higher current MPCs.<sup>2</sup> To establish the high-MPC result, I introduce the approach of using behavioral wedges to capture how future consumption rules deviate from their optimal counterparts (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Congdon, 2012; Baicker, Mullainathan and Schwartzstein, 2015; Farhi and Gabaix, 2020). I can then study the impact of future mistakes independent of specific biases. I show how this approach can nest many widely studied behavioral biases, such as inattention, present bias, diagnostic expectations, and near-rationality (epsilon-mistakes).

Why do future mistakes in response to saving changes (i.e. changes in asset balances) lead to higher current MPCs? These future mistakes diminish the value of changing saving relative to the value of changing current consumption. Anticipating these future mistakes, the consumer is less willing to adjust her saving and more willing to adjust her current consumption. Hence she displays higher current MPCs. This result is true no matter whether future consumption mistakes take the form of over-reaction or under-reaction to saving changes.

As an example, consider the response to a positive current income shock. If the consumer increases her saving, the additional saving will not be spent optimally, because she cannot perfectly smooth increases in her future consumption. As a result, the value of increasing saving relative to the value of increasing current consumption diminishes. The consumer is then more willing to

---

<sup>1</sup>Stephens and Unayama (2011), Olafsson and Pagel (2018), Ganong and Noel (2019), and McDowall (2020) also find that high-liquidity consumers display high MPCs.

<sup>2</sup>This high-MPC result contrasts with the direct impact of current behavioral mistakes on current MPCs. The direct impact can lead to either higher MPCs (e.g., hyperbolic discounting) or lower MPCs (e.g., inattention).

increase her current consumption and exhibits a higher current MPC.<sup>3</sup>

To isolate my mechanism, I first establish my high-MPC result in a simple example with quadratic utility. This clarifies that my high-MPC result does not arise from the precautionary saving motive. My high-MPC result extends to general concave utility, under an additional condition: mistakes in future consumption only take the form of mistakes in response to saving changes, while there are no mistakes in the absence of shocks. Many popular behavioral models satisfy this condition. For example, in models of beliefs-driven behavioral biases such as inattention and diagnostic expectations, belief mistakes only happen when the underlying fundamental deviates from the pre-shock default value (Sims, 2003; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo, 2022). As another example, for present bias agents with access to a commitment device (Laibson 1997; Angeletos et al. 2001), they can achieve optimal consumption through the commitment device in absence of the shock, but not in response to it. Finally, I provide additional results regarding how future mistakes in response to saving changes can still lead to higher current MPCs even when the previous condition does not hold.

The high-MPC result can be easily extended to the case of partial sophistication, i.e., partial understanding of future mistakes. An interesting comparative statics result is that current MPCs increase with the degree of sophistication.

Beyond the specific application of MPCs, a goal of the paper is to illustrate that predictions of sophistication (i.e., the anticipation of future mistakes) can be studied independently of the underlying behavioral biases. The sophistication channel can be crucial in determining behavior, such as “doing it now or later” in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001). There is also ample empirical evidence that consumers have a nontrivial degree of sophistication (e.g., Allcott et al., 2022; Carrera et al., 2022; Le Yaouanq and Schwardmann, 2022).<sup>4</sup> But the impact of sophistication is often studied in the context of a *specific* mistake, typically present bias. Here, I instead study its behavioral impact more broadly, independent of the exact mistakes.

**Related literature.** The most related papers are Ilut and Valchev (2023) and Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022). They also develop behavioral explanations of high-liquidity consumers’ high MPCs. Ilut and Valchev (2023)’s theory is based on the consumer’s imperfect problem solving. The high-MPC result there comes from the consumer’s difficulty in calculating her optimal consumption rule. But Ilut and Valchev (2023) focus on the naive case and do not study the impact of future mistakes on current consumption. Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022) instead generate high MPCs from diagnostic expectations. Though they predominantly focus on the naive case, Bianchi, Ilut and

---

<sup>3</sup>By the same token, for a negative current income shock, the value of decreasing saving is extra negative, again because her future selves cannot perfectly smooth their consumption decreases in response to the saving decrease. The consumer is then more willing to decrease her current consumption and again exhibits a higher current MPC.

<sup>4</sup>For example, in the context of present bias, Allcott et al. (2022) find that the degree of sophistication is close to 1.

Saijo (2022) show that MPCs under sophistication are higher than MPCs under naivete. Through the lens of my paper, this result arises because diagnostic expectations lead to mistakes in future consumption’s response to saving changes in their model.<sup>5</sup>

Compared to the broader behavioral literature on intertemporal consumption (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Matejka, 2016; Gabaix, 2016; Mackowiak, Matejka and Wiederholt, 2021), the key difference is that my paper establishes predictions independent of specific behavioral biases. The early present-bias literature (Laibson, 1997; Angeletos et al., 2001) studies the sophistication case and incorporates the impact of future present bias on current consumption. But this channel is not the main focus of these papers.

Related are also Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Congdon (2012), Baicker, Mullainathan and Schwartzstein (2015), and Farhi and Gabaix (2020). They use the wedge approach to conduct behavioral welfare analysis and study optimal policy with behavioral agents. I instead use the wedge approach to study a *positive* question, how sophistication impacts current MPCs independent of the specific behavioral biases.

## 2 An Illustrative Example

I start with the simplest example of how future mistakes can lead to higher current MPCs. The consumer lives for three periods,  $t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ . Her utility is given by

$$u(c_0) + u(c_1) + u(c_2), \tag{1}$$

where  $u(\cdot) : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is strictly concave and increasing and the discount factor is 1 for simplicity. For illustrative purposes, I let  $u(\cdot)$  be quadratic so the consumption rule is linear. The result will be generalized to the case with general concave utility in Section 3.

The consumer can save and borrow through a risk-free asset with a gross interest rate  $R = 1$ . To isolate the friction of interest, she is not subject to borrowing constraints.

The question of interest is how consumption  $c_0$  responds to an income shock  $\Delta$  at  $t = 0$ . That is, the current MPC. For illustrative purposes, in this section, the shock  $\Delta$  is the only source of income for the consumer. Without the shock, income in each  $t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$  is normalized to zero

---

<sup>5</sup>Mullainathan (2002) and Azeredo da Silveira and Woodford (2019) generate high MPCs because consumers’ expectation of future income over-reacts to changes in current income. On the other hand, the channel in my paper leads to high MPCs even if consumers form rational expectations about their future incomes. Boutros (2022) shows that finite planning horizon can also generate high-liquidity consumers’ high MPCs.

and the initial wealth is also normalized to zero. Together, her intertemporal budget is given by

$$w_1 = \Delta - c_0 \quad \text{and} \quad w_2 = w_1 - c_1, \quad (2)$$

where  $w_t$  is the consumer's wealth/saving at the start of period  $t$ . Without the shock ( $\Delta = 0$ ), optimal consumption at each period  $t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$  is simply given by  $\bar{c}_t = 0$ .

Now let us turn to the consumer's consumption policy. In period  $t = 2$ , the consumer consumes her remaining saving<sup>6</sup>

$$c_2(w_2) = w_2. \quad (3)$$

In period  $t = 1$ , the consumer's actual consumption rule is given exogenously by

$$c_1(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \lambda_1)w_1. \quad (4)$$

Compared to the frictionless consumption rule  $c_1^{\text{Frictionless}}(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}w_1$ ,  $\lambda_1$  in (4) captures the mistake in response to changes in saving  $w_1$ . When  $\lambda_1 > 0$ ,  $c_1$  under-reacts to  $w_1$ . When  $\lambda_1 < 0$ ,  $c_1$  over-reacts to  $w_1$ . As illustrated shortly, this is the type of future mistakes that leads to a higher MPC at  $t = 0$ .

I then study how the future mistake  $\lambda_1$  impacts the current MPC at  $t = 0$ . To this end, I define  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)$  which captures self  $t = 0$ 's optimal consumption taking her future consumption rules (3) and (4) as given:

$$c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta) \equiv \arg \max_{c_0} u(c_0) + u(c_1(w_1)) + u(c_2(w_2)) \quad (5)$$

subject to the budget (2).  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)$  isolates the impact of future mistakes  $\lambda_1$  because it is the consumption that the consumer would have chosen at  $t = 0$  if she were not subject to any current mistake but took her future mistakes as given. I hence term it "deliberate consumption." The current MPC is then given by  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)}{\partial \Delta}$ .<sup>7</sup>

To better understand the intuition of the high-MPC result, I write (5) in a recursive form. Self 0 trades off between the utility of current consumption and the continuation value of saving:

$$c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta) = \arg \max_{c_0} u(c_0) + V_1(w_1), \quad (6)$$

where  $w_1 = \Delta - c_0$  as in (2) and  $V_1(w_1)$  captures the continuation value function, defined based

<sup>6</sup>Note that  $c_2$  can be negative. This makes sure that the problem is always well defined.

<sup>7</sup> $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  does not depend on  $\Delta$  because  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)$  is linear. Below,  $V_1''$  does not depend on  $w_1$  because  $V_1(w_1)$  is quadratic.

on future consumption rules in (3) and (4):

$$\begin{aligned} V_1(w_1) &\equiv u(c_1(w_1)) + u(c_2(w_1 - c_1(w_1))) \\ &= u\left(\frac{1}{2}(1 - \lambda_1)w_1\right) + u\left(\frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_1)w_1\right). \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

I can then establish the main result.

**Proposition 1.** *1. **Excess concavity of the continuation value:** The concavity of the continuation value function  $|V_1''| = \frac{1}{2}|u''|(1 + \lambda_1^2)$  strictly increases with the future mistake  $|\lambda_1|$ .*

*2. **Higher current MPCs:** The current MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{\frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_1^2)}{1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_1^2)}$  strictly increases with the future mistake  $|\lambda_1|$ .*

Proposition 1 shows that the future consumption mistake in response to saving changes (a larger  $|\lambda_1|$ ) leads to a higher current MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$ . The high-MPC result holds regardless of whether the future consumption mistake takes the form of under-reaction ( $\lambda_1 > 0$ ) or over-reaction ( $\lambda_1 < 0$ ). The result is independent of the exact behavioral causes of the future mistake  $\lambda_1$ .

To better understand the high-MPC result, note that the value of changing saving  $w_1$  by  $\xi$  is<sup>8</sup>

$$V_1(\xi) - V_1(0) = u'(0) \cdot \xi - \frac{1}{2}|V_1''| \cdot \xi^2. \quad (8)$$

This value decreases with the future mistake  $|\lambda_1|$  for any  $\xi \neq 0$ , because of the excess concavity in  $|V_1''|$ . Intuitively, because of the future mistake in response to saving changes, the consumer cannot perfectly smooth her future consumption responses to saving changes. The value of changing saving is then decreased (for both an increase in saving  $\xi > 0$  and a decrease in saving  $\xi < 0$ ).

On the other hand, the value of changing current consumption  $c_0$  by  $\xi$  is

$$u(\xi) - u(0) = u'(0) \cdot \xi - \frac{1}{2}|u''| \cdot \xi^2, \quad (9)$$

independent of the future mistake  $|\lambda_1|$ .

(8) and (9) together mean that the future mistake diminishes the value of changing saving relative to the value of changing current consumption. The consumer is then more willing to change her current consumption and exhibits a higher current MPC.

For example, consider a positive current income shock  $\Delta > 0$ . The value of increasing saving relative to the value of increasing current consumption diminishes because of the future mistake  $\lambda_1$ . The consumer is then more willing to increase her current consumption and exhibits a higher

---

<sup>8</sup>Without the shock ( $\Delta = 0$ ), the consumption  $c_0$  and the saving  $w_1$  are simply given by 0. That is why the baseline values in (8) and (9) are  $V_1(0)$  and  $u(0)$ .

current MPC. By the same token, for a negative current income shock  $\Delta < 0$ , the value of decreasing saving in (8) is extra negative. The consumer is more willing to decrease her current consumption and again exhibits a higher current MPC.

The key to the high-MPC result is mistakes in the future consumption's *response* to saving changes. To see this more clearly, we can extend the consumption rule in (4) to

$$c_1(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \lambda_1)w_1 - \bar{\lambda}_1, \quad (10)$$

which now allows two types of mistakes compared to the frictionless consumption rule  $c_1^{\text{Frictionless}}(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}w_1$ . First, same as in (4),  $\lambda_1$  captures the mistake in response to changes in saving  $w_1$ . Second, (10) also allows the mistake in the overall consumption level in the absence of the shock ( $\Delta = 0$ ). Specifically,  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  captures how much the pre-shock ( $\Delta = 0$ ) consumption level deviates from its frictionless level, 0. When  $\bar{\lambda}_1 > 0$ , the consumer under-consumes at  $t = 1$ . When  $\bar{\lambda}_1 < 0$ , the consumer over-consumes at  $t = 1$ . In the environment here,  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  is solely a function of the mistake in response to saving changes,  $\lambda_1$ , but is independent of the mistake in the pre-shock consumption level,  $\bar{\lambda}_1$ .<sup>9</sup> Intuitively, the MPC is about how the consumer responds to the income shock  $\Delta$ , so it is directly connected to how future consumption responds to saving changes,  $\lambda_1$ , instead of its overall level,  $\bar{\lambda}_1$ .

It is important to clarify that the high-MPC result in Proposition 1 does not come from the precautionary saving motive. This can be seen from Proposition 1 here, because the quadratic utility here a fortiori shuts down the precautionary saving motive. See Section 4 for further discussion.

### 3 The Main High-MPC Result

In this Section, I consider a standard intertemporal consumption and saving problem with general concave utilities. I study how future consumption mistakes in response to saving changes lead to higher current MPCs.

**Utility, budget, and consumption rules.** The consumer's utility is given by

$$U_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \delta^t u(c_t) + \delta^T v(a_T + y_T), \quad (11)$$

where  $c_t$  is her consumption in period  $t \in \{0, 1, \dots, T-1\}$ ,  $\delta$  is her discount factor,  $u(\cdot)$  captures the utility from consumption, and  $v(\cdot) : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  captures the utility from retirement or bequests.

---

<sup>9</sup>See Online Appendix A for details.

The final wealth  $w_T = a_T + y_T$  is allowed to be negative, since the utility from retirement or bequests  $v(\cdot)$  is defined on the entirety of  $\mathbb{R}$ . This guarantees that, even with consumption mistakes, the budget in (13) is always satisfied and the intrapersonal problem is always well defined.<sup>10</sup> Both  $u(\cdot)$  and  $v(\cdot)$  are strictly increasing and strictly concave.

The consumer can save and borrow through a risk-free asset and is subject to the budget constraints

$$a_{t+1} = R(a_t + y_t - c_t) \quad \forall t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}, \quad (12)$$

where  $y_t$  is her exogenous income in period  $t$ ,  $a_t$  is her wealth (i.e. saving/borrowing) at the start of period  $t$ , and  $R$  is the gross interest rate on the risk-free asset.

To isolate the friction of interest, the consumer is not subject to any borrowing constraints. Her budget constraint (12) can then be rewritten as

$$w_{t+1} = R(w_t - c_t) \quad \forall t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}, \quad (13)$$

where  $w_t = a_t + y_t + \sum_{k=1}^{T-t} R^{-k} y_{t+k}$  is her total wealth in period  $t$ , including her saving and the present value of her current and future income.

To study MPCs, I study how consumption at  $t = 0$  responds to an income shock  $\Delta$  at  $t = 0$ :  $y_0 = \bar{y}_0 \rightarrow y_0 = \bar{y}_0 + \Delta$ , or equivalently  $w_0 = \bar{w}_0 \rightarrow w_0 = \bar{w}_0 + \Delta$ , where I use a bar over a variable to capture its pre-shock value ( $\Delta = 0$ ). For illustration purposes, I follow Chetty and Szeidl (2007) and let  $\Delta$  be the only source of income uncertainty in the main analysis. Cases with gradual resolution of income uncertainty will be studied in Section 4 below.

I use the widely adapted “multiple-selves” language as in Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) and Harris and Laibson (2001): self  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$  is in charge of consumption and saving at time  $t$ . I use  $c_t(w_t)$  to denote self  $t$ ’s actual consumption rules, subject to behavioral mistakes.<sup>11</sup> For example, (4) in Section 2 above.

**Isolating the impact of future mistakes on current consumption.** The main focus of the paper is how future mistakes embedded in future consumption  $\{c_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  affect the current MPC at  $t = 0$ . To isolate this channel, I introduce *deliberate* consumption  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0)$  as in (5). That is, the consumption that self 0 would have chosen given the utility (11), if she were not subject to any current mistakes but took future selves’ mistakes in  $\{c_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  as given. The following definition extends the notion of deliberate consumption to all  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ .

<sup>10</sup>The final period does not play a special role: in Corollary 1, I show that the consumer’s MPCs converge to simple limits when  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ .

<sup>11</sup>For technical reasons, I also assume  $u$ ,  $v$ , and  $c_t$  are third-order continuously differentiable.

**Definition 1.** For each  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ , self  $t$ 's deliberate consumption optimizes the consumer's utility in (11), taking future selves' actual consumption rules  $\{c_{t+k}(w_{t+k})\}_{k=1}^{T-t-1}$  as given:

$$c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t) \equiv \arg \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \sum_{k=1}^{T-t-1} \delta^k u(c_{t+k}(w_{t+k})) + \delta^{T-t} v(w_T), \quad (14)$$

subject to the budget in (13).

**Future consumption mistakes and higher current MPC.** With general concave utilities here, the high-MPC result in Proposition 1 remains true, under an additional condition: mistakes in future consumption only take the form of mistakes in response to saving changes, while there are no mistakes in the absence of the shock  $\Delta$ . As studied in Section 5, many popular behavioral foundations satisfy this condition.

To formalize this condition, I use  $\bar{c}_t$  and  $\bar{w}_t$  to capture the pre-shock ( $\Delta = 0$ ) outcomes, satisfying  $\bar{c}_t = c_t(\bar{w}_t)$  and  $\bar{w}_{t+1} = R(\bar{w}_t - \bar{c}_t)$ , for  $t \in \{0, 1, \dots, T-1\}$ . The condition that there are no mistakes in the absence of the shock  $\Delta$  means:

$$\{\bar{c}_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1} \text{ maximize (11) s.t. (13) with } w_0 = \bar{w}_0, \quad (15)$$

or equivalently  $c_t(\bar{w}_t) = c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)$  for  $t \in \{0, 1, \dots, T-1\}$ . Under (15), future consumption mistakes take the form of  $c_t$  inefficiently responding to changes in  $w_t$ . Similar to (4), I use  $\lambda_t$  to capture this mistake for  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ , defined as

$$\phi_t = (1 - \lambda_t) \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}, \quad (16)$$

where  $\phi_t \equiv \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t}$  captures how future self  $t$ 's actual consumption responds to changes in  $w_t$  while  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t}$  captures how future self  $t$ 's should have responded to changes in  $w_t$ . When  $\lambda_t > 0$ , future self  $t$  under-reacts to changes in  $w_t$ . When  $\lambda_t < 0$ , future self  $t$  over-reacts to changes in  $w_t$ . I now study how future mistakes in response to saving changes  $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  lead to higher MPCs at  $t = 0$ .

**Proposition 2.** If (15) holds,  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_0)}{\partial w_0}$  increases with each future mistake  $|\lambda_t|$ , for  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ .

The intuition is exactly the same as in Proposition 1. Because of future mistakes in response to saving changes, future selves cannot perfectly smooth their consumption responses to saving changes and future consumption responses will concentrate in certain periods. The value of changing saving is then decreased relative to value of changing current consumption (for both a positive

shock and a negative shock). The consumer is then less willing to adjust her saving and more willing to adjust her current consumption. Hence she displays higher current MPCs.

**From deliberate MPCs to current MPCs.** Proposition 2 focuses on the deliberate MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$ , which isolates the impact of future mistakes on the current MPC. The deliberate MPC and self 0's own mistake  $\lambda_0$  jointly determine the current actual MPC:

$$\phi_0 = (1 - \lambda_0) \phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}.$$

There are two reasons why I focus on the deliberate MPC. First, the direct impact of  $\lambda_0$  on the MPC  $\phi_0$  is well understood. Second, the direct impact depends on the specific bias under consideration. It can lead to either a higher MPC (e.g., present bias) or a lower MPCs (e.g., inattention). I instead want to establish a high-MPC result independent of the underlying biases.

If one is interested in the total effects of behavioral biases on the current MPC, one can combine the direct impact of  $\lambda_0$  with the impact of future mistakes  $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  through the deliberate MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$ . If the studied behavior bias leads to over-reaction (negative  $\lambda$ s), both channels lead to higher MPCs. If the behavior bias leads to under-reaction (positive  $\lambda$ s), which channel dominates depends on the relative size of current mistake ( $\lambda_0$ ) and future mistakes ( $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ ). Interestingly, for the inattention interpretation studied below in Section 5, it is likely that the consumer is currently attentive to a stimulus check ( $\lambda_0 = 0$ ) but becomes inattentive to saving changes driven by the stimulus check over time ( $\lambda_t > 0$  for  $t \geq 1$ ). In this case, the impact of future inattention unambiguously translates into a higher current actual MPC.

## 4 Extensions and Numerical Illustrations

**The  $T \rightarrow \infty$  limit.** The deliberate MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  in Proposition 2 converges to simple limits when all future selves share the same friction  $\lambda_t = \lambda$  and the consumer's horizon  $T$  goes to infinity.

**Corollary 1.** *Consider the CRRA case with  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ ,  $v(c) = \kappa \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ , and (15). Let  $\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} > 1$  and  $\lambda_t = \lambda$  with  $|\lambda| < \left(\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{2}}$  for all  $t \geq 1$ . We have, for  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ ,*

$$\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \rightarrow \phi^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} - 1}{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (1 - \lambda^2)}. \quad (17)$$

When  $\lambda \rightarrow \left( \left( \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} \right)^-$ , the deliberate MPC  $\phi^{\text{Deliberate}}$  achieves its upper bound,

$$\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow \left( \left( \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} \right)^-} \phi^{\text{Deliberate}} = 1.$$

That is, when future selves' consumption mistakes are large enough, the current self 0 is so worried about her future selves' mistakes that she follows a simple rule of thumb: she consumes all changes in  $w_0$ . She is effectively "hand-to-mouth" with respect to shocks to  $w_0$ .

**Gradual resolution of income uncertainty and a numerical illustration.** With gradual resolution of income uncertainty, things are more complicated and an analytical characterization seems impossible. In practice, however, the high-MPC result in Proposition 2 continues to hold as long as a condition akin to (15) holds: there are no mistakes in future consumptions when incomes are realized at their median levels.

To illustrate, I conduct a numerical exercise in Figure 1. With gradual resolution of income uncertainty, it is clearer if I explicitly work with different components of the budget (12):

$$a_{t+1} = R(a_t + y_t - c_t),$$

where the random income  $y_t \sim \log \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$  is drawn i.i.d. across each period  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ .<sup>12</sup> To illustrate the robustness of my result, I also introduce borrowing constraints: for all  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ ,

$$a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}.$$

In this environment, it is easier to write the consumption rule of each self  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$  as a function of cash on hand  $x_t \equiv a_t + y_t$ ,  $c_t(x_t)$ . Similar to (15), I impose that there are no mistakes when the stochastic incomes are realized at their median levels. That is, for  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ , actual consumptions coincide with their deliberate counterparts

$$c_t(\bar{x}_t) = c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{x}_t),$$

where  $\bar{x}_{t+1} = R(\bar{x}_t - c_t(\bar{x}_t) + 1)$ , for  $t \in \{0, 1, \dots, T-1\}$ .<sup>13</sup>

Similar to (16), future consumptions respond inefficiently to saving changes

$$\phi_t = (1 - \lambda_t) \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}, \tag{18}$$

---

<sup>12</sup>The income shock  $\Delta$  considered above can be viewed as a shock to  $y_0$ .

<sup>13</sup>Note that the median of  $y_t$  is 1.

where  $\phi_t \equiv \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{x}_t)}{\partial x_t}$  and  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{x}_t)}{\partial x_t}$  and  $\lambda_t$  captures self  $t$ 's mistake. To extend (18) globally, for each  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ ,

$$c_t(x_t) = \min \left\{ -\frac{a}{R} + x_t, c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}((1 - \lambda_t)x_t + \lambda_t \bar{x}_t) \right\}, \quad (19)$$

which makes sure that the consumer will not violate her borrowing constraints despite her mistakes.

From future selves' actual consumption rules  $\{c_t(x_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ , one can calculate current self 0's deliberate consumption  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(x_0)$  and find her MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  as usual. I numerically solved the following case:  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ ;  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ ;  $\gamma = 1.1$ ;  $\sigma = 1$ ;  $\delta = 0.902$ ;  $R = 1.04$ ;  $a = 0$ , and  $\lambda_t = \lambda$ . The values of  $\gamma$ ,  $\delta$ , and  $R$  are from Fagereng et al. (2021).

In Figure 1, I plot a high-liquidity consumer's  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}/\phi_0^{\text{Frictionless}}$  as a function of  $\lambda$ .<sup>14</sup> I then compare it to  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}/\phi_0^{\text{Frictionless}}$  calculated analytically in Corollary 1 without gradual resolution of uncertainty. We can see that the deliberate MPCs are very similar and the main lesson regarding how future mistakes in response to saving changes increase the current MPC is unchanged. In Online Appendix B.2, I conduct robustness checks based on other parameterizations and the main lesson remains the same.




Figure 1: Gradual Resolution of Uncertainty.

**Partial sophistication.** In the main analysis, for simplicity, I study the case of full sophistication. That is, I define the deliberate consumption (14) based on correct anticipation of future actual consumption rules and future mistakes. But the high-MPC result can also be extended to the case of partial sophistication, i.e., partial understanding of future mistakes.

To illustrate, first notice that the main analysis can accommodate a more general interpretation

<sup>14</sup>Since I am focusing on the behavior away from liquidity constraints, I focus on a consumer with initial cash on hand  $\bar{x}_0 = 50 \cdot E[y_t]$ .

if I re-define current self 0's deliberate consumption based on her perceived future consumption rules  $\{\tilde{c}_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ . I can then define self 0's perceived future mistakes  $\{\tilde{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  as how  $\{\tilde{c}_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  deviate from what she deems optimal, an extension to (16). Proposition 2 can then be re-stated as how perceived future mistakes  $\{\tilde{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  increase the current MPC,  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$ . See Corollary 2 in Online Appendix B.1.

One important example of how perceived future mistakes are determined is the case of partial sophistication in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001). That is, the current self has a partial understanding of future mistakes, and her perceived future mistake at  $t$  is given by:

$$\tilde{\lambda}_t = s\lambda_t, \quad (20)$$

where  $s \in [0, 1]$  captures the degree of current self 0's sophistication. There are two lessons. First, partial sophistication suffices for all qualitative results about how future mistakes increase current MPCs. Second, current MPCs increase with the degree of sophistication. This comparative statics prediction, formalized in Corollary 3 in Online Appendix B.1, can be empirically tested.

**The role of perceived dynamic inconsistency.** The above reinterpretation also helps clarify what I mean by future “mistakes.” The reason why these future mistakes impact current behavior is: the current self anticipates that her future selves will deviate from what she deems optimal; she then adjusts her current consumption accordingly.<sup>15</sup> This can be seen from Corollary 2 in Online Appendix B.1 mentioned above: the perceived future mistakes  $\{\tilde{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  that increase the current MPC are defined exactly as how the current self's perceived future consumption rules  $\{\tilde{c}_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  deviate from what she deems optimal. In other words, the key element for the focused channel is a form of perceived dynamic inconsistency.

**The precautionary saving motive.** What happens if (15) is not satisfied and the consumer also exhibits future mistakes in the absence of the shock  $\Delta$ ? These mistakes generate an additional channel: the precautionary saving motive. But the precautionary saving motive is about how the dispersion of the levels of future consumption across states or time decreases the *level* of current consumption (increases the level of saving). This channel is different from my main high-MPC channel.<sup>16'17</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>Consistent with the reinterpretation here,  $\{c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  defined in Definition 1 can be interpreted as the consumption that self 0 thinks is optimal at each future period  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ . This is because, in the main analysis, self 0's perceived future consumption rules are given by actual future consumption rules  $\{c_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ . By the same token, future mistakes  $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  defined in (16) can then be interpreted as how self 0's perceived future consumptions deviate from what she deems optimal.

<sup>16</sup>In the literature, the dispersion of the levels of future consumption behind the precautionary saving motive often comes from future uncertainty or liquidity constraints (Kimball, 1990; Carroll, 1997; Holm, 2018). In my framework, such dispersion comes from future mistakes in the overall levels of consumption in the absence of the shock  $\Delta$ .

<sup>17</sup>It is easy to see that my high-MPC result does not come from the precautionary saving motive from Proposition

I now use the simple 3-period example in Section 2 to illustrate the precautionary saving channel within my framework. The consumer has a  $t = 1$  consumption rule

$$c_1(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}w_1 - \bar{\lambda}_1, \quad (21)$$

where  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  captures the mistake in the overall consumption level at  $t = 1$  in the absence of the shock ( $\Delta = 0$ ). When  $\bar{\lambda}_1 > 0$ , the consumer under-consumes at  $t = 1$ . When  $\bar{\lambda}_1 < 0$ , the consumer over-consumes at  $t = 1$ .

At  $t = 2$ , the consumer's consumption rule is then given by

$$c_2(w_2) = w_2 = w_1 - c_1(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}w_1 + \bar{\lambda}_1. \quad (22)$$

We can see that the mistake in the overall consumption level  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  introduces the dispersion of consumption levels across time. With a "prudent" utility ( $u''' > 0$ ), such dispersion will decrease the current consumption level and increase the current saving level.

**Proposition 3.** *Consider the case with a prudent utility ( $u''' > 0$ ) with (21). For each  $\Delta$ ,  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)$  decreases with  $|\bar{\lambda}_1|$  in a neighborhood of  $\bar{\lambda}_1 = 0$ .*

Compared to the main high-MPC result in Proposition 2, Proposition 3 has two key differences. First, Proposition 3 is about the level of current consumption  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)$  instead of the MPC  $\frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)}{\partial \Delta}$ . Second, Proposition 3 is about the impact of future mistakes in the overall consumption level  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  instead of future mistakes in response to saving changes  $\lambda_1$ . A rough intuition is: the level of current consumption  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)$  should be connected to future mistakes in the overall consumption level (Proposition 3). On the other hand, the MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  is about how the consumer responds to the income shock, so it is directly connected to how future consumption responds to saving changes (Proposition 2). Since this paper is about the MPC, the latter type of mistake plays a key role throughout.

A natural question is whether the precautionary saving motive driven by future mistakes in overall consumption level  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  can also impact the current MPC. In theory, this is possible (Carroll, Holm and Kimball, 2021). Taking a derivative with respect to  $w_0$  of the FOC of the problem in (6), the current MPC is given by:

$$\frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0)}{\partial w_0} = \frac{V_1''(w_0 - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0))}{u''(c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0)) + V_1''(w_0 - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0))}. \quad (23)$$

From Proposition 3, we know that the precautionary saving motive driven by  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  will decrease

---

1. The quadratic utility case there a fortiori shuts down the precautionary saving motive.

$c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0)$ . Such a decrease in  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0)$  may impact the MPC in (23) through third-order effects when  $u''' \neq 0$  and/or  $V_1''' \neq 0$ . This is a higher-order effect than the main high-MPC result. Unless mistakes in overall consumption level  $\bar{\lambda}_1$  are big, this channel will not impact the MPC that much. See Figure 5 in Online Appendix B.3 for a numerical illustration.<sup>18</sup>

## 5 Behavioral Foundations

The main results in the previous section do not depend on the exact causes of future mistakes. This section shows how my framework can accommodate many widely-studied behavioral foundations, such as inattention, diagnostic expectations, present bias, and near-rationality (epsilon-mistakes).

**Inattention.** My framework can accommodate inattention (e.g. Sims, 2003; Gabaix, 2014; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015). Here, I follow the sparsity approach in Gabaix (2014) and let each self  $t$ 's perceived  $w_t$  be given by

$$w_t^p(w_t) = (1 - \lambda_t)w_t + \lambda_t w_t^d, \quad (24)$$

where  $\lambda_t \in [0, 1]$  captures self  $t$ 's degree of inattention (a larger  $\lambda_t$  means more inattention) and  $w_t^d$  captures the default. It is standard to set the default  $w_t^d$  to be the pre-shock value  $\bar{w}_t$  (Gabaix, 2014). As a corollary of Proposition 2, future consumption mistakes in the form of inattention to saving changes  $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  lead to higher current MPCs. This is Corollary 4 in Online Appendix B.5. Online Appendix B.5 further discusses what forms of inattention lead to perceived dynamic inconsistency and lead to higher current MPCs.

**Diagnostic expectations.** Above, inattention leads to under-reaction of future consumption in response to saving changes. Here I study the case of diagnostic expectations, which leads to over-reaction of future consumption in response to saving changes. Despite this difference, both types of future mistakes lead to higher current MPCs.

To illustrate, consider the three-period example with quadratic utility in Section 2, similar to the setting in Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022). In the final period  $t = 2$ , as in (3), the consumer consumes all her remaining saving,  $c_2(w_2) = w_2$ . In the middle period  $t = 1$ , the consumer over-

---

<sup>18</sup>In applications, the essentially only possibility that future mistakes in overall consumption levels are large enough to matter for MPCs in (23) is that these mistakes take a multiplicative form, e.g.,  $c_1(w_1) = c_1^{\text{Deliberate}}((1 - \Lambda_1)w_1)$ , where  $\Lambda_1 \neq 0$  captures a multiplicative mistake. See Proposition 4 in Online Appendix B.4 for a detailed discussion.

reacts to changes in her saving because of diagnostic expectations:<sup>19</sup>

$$c_1(w_1) = \frac{1 + \theta}{2 + \theta} w_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{\theta}{2 + \theta} \right) w_1, \quad (25)$$

where  $\theta > 0$  measures the degree of over-reaction in expectation. Online Appendix B.6 contains the detailed derivation of (25).

For such a consumer, higher saving  $w_1$  triggers more vivid memories of good times and leads her to become overly optimistic about  $c_2$ . On the other hand, lower saving  $w_1$  triggers more vivid memories of bad times and leads her to become overly pessimistic about  $c_2$ . Such diagnostic expectations are based on the representativeness heuristic of probabilistic judgments in psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2018; Bordalo et al., 2020).

In fact, this case is nested by the analysis in Section 2: (25) is nested by (4) with  $\lambda = -\frac{\theta}{2+\theta}$ . As a Corollary of Proposition 1, future diagnostic expectations lead to higher current MPCs. This result is related to Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022), which study how diagnostic expectations impact MPCs. In fact, Propositions 5 and 8 in Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022) show that MPCs under sophistication are higher than MPCs under naivete. That is, the anticipation of future diagnostic expectations increases the current MPC. Viewed through the lens of my paper, this result arises because diagnostic expectations lead to future mistakes in response to saving changes. However, Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022) mostly focus on the case of naivete.

**Present bias.** For present bias, the main high-MPC result in Proposition 2 nests the case with commitment devices, e.g., the original Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001). In this case, the consumer can put her saving in illiquid assets with costly withdrawals to avoid over-consumption driven by present bias and achieve optimal consumption in the absence of shocks. As a result, (15) holds. On the other hand, in response to shocks, the commitment device no longer prevents her from consuming sub-optimally because of costly withdrawals from the illiquid assets. Together, the main high-MPC result applies and Corollary 7 in Online Appendix B.7 provides a full formalization. It is worth noting that both Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001) study the sophistication case and incorporate the impact of future mistakes. However, these papers focus more on the impact of current present bias on current consumption.

For the case without access to illiquid assets as a commitment device (Barro, 1999; Harris and Laibson, 2001). Present bias introduces both mistakes in response to saving changes (which lead to higher MPCs) and mistakes in overall consumption levels (which lead to the precautionary saving

---

<sup>19</sup>The case studied here is the “distant memory”  $J \geq 2$  case in Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022). This means that the reference point for diagnostic expectations at  $t = 1$  is invariant to outcomes at  $t = 0$ . In this case, the law of iterated expectations fails under sophistication, leading to a form of perceived dynamic inconsistency. That is, the  $t = 0$  self anticipates that  $t = 1$  behavior will deviate from what she deems optimal. As discussed above, this is the key reason why future mistakes lead to higher current MPCs.

motive). When the utility function is not that concave ( $EIS > 1$ ), the high-MPC channel I focus on in Proposition 2 dominates and future mistakes still unambiguously lead to higher MPCs. When the utility function is very concave ( $EIS < 1$ ), the precautionary saving channel in Proposition 3 may dominate. See Corollary 8 in Online Appendix B.7 for details.

**Near-rationality and epsilon-mistakes.** The main mechanism studied in the paper focuses on mistakes in response to saving changes. A natural question is why the consumer may exhibit these mistakes. It turns out that, if the consumer starts from a frictionless pre-shock outcome (15), the utility loss of mistakes in response to saving changes is small, second-order. This is the “near-rationality” argument laid out by Cochrane (1989) and Kueng (2018) about the small welfare loss of inefficient responses to shocks.

This near-rationality result implies that the consumer may be prone to “epsilon-mistakes.” That is, stochastic mistakes that do not bias the consumer’s response to saving changes in a particular way. For example,  $\lambda_t \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_t^2)$  in (16). Corollary 9 in Online Appendix B.8 shows how these stochastic mistakes in response to saving changes increase current MPCs, even though these stochastic mistakes do not lead to on average over-reaction or under-reaction of future consumption.

**An intra-household interpretation.** My result also accommodates an alternative intra-household interpretation. The unitary model of household spending has long been rejected and it has been widely documented that the wife and husband exhibit different consumption behavior (Thomas, 1990; Browning et al., 1994; Anderson and Baland, 2002; Duflo, 2003; Duflo and Udry, 2004; Ashraf, 2009). In the intertemporal setting, there is strong evidence that household consumption behavior fluctuates over time (Mazzocco, 2007; Lise and Yamada, 2019), depending on which spouse has a temporarily higher decision weight. From the lens of my model, this means that future consumption (e.g., determined by the husband) may deviate from what the current consumer (e.g., the wife) deems optimal. She then displays a higher MPC because, from her perspective, future consumption will respond inefficiently to saving changes.

**An interpretation independent of specific biases.** Beyond the specific biases studied above, let me provide another interpretation independent of specific biases. From her life experiences, the consumer knows that she has cognitive limitations and her future consumption may not respond efficiently to saving changes. With this knowledge and even without knowledge of the exact future mistakes, the consumer will exhibit a higher current MPC.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, I show how future consumption mistakes in response to saving changes lead to higher current MPCs. This channel is independent of liquidity constraints and helps explain the

empirical puzzles on high-liquidity consumers' high MPCs. The main approach, using wedges to capture behavioral mistakes and deriving robust predictions of sophistication independent of the exact psychological cause of these mistakes, can be useful in many other contexts.

The key intermediate step to prove the high-MPC result is to establish the excess concavity of the continuation value function (e.g., Part 1 of Proposition 1). That is, mistakes in response to saving changes make saving changes extra costly. The same excess concavity can help explain other well-known puzzles in intertemporal decisions. For example, future mistakes in response to saving changes lead to higher risk aversion and help explain the equity premium puzzle. To see this, note that a consumer's degree of risk aversion is proportional to the second derivative of her value function, which is its concavity.

## Appendices

All other proofs can be found in Online Appendix A.

### Proof of Proposition 1.

Based on the consumption rules in (3) and (4) and the definition of  $V_1(w_1)$  in (7), we know

$$V_1'(w_1) = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \lambda_1) u' \left( \frac{1}{2} (1 - \lambda_1) w_1 \right) + \frac{1}{2} (1 + \lambda_1) u' \left( \frac{1}{2} (1 + \lambda_1) w_1 \right).$$

Since  $u$  is quadratic, we know that  $u''$  is a constant and

$$V_1'' = u'' \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{4} (1 - \lambda_1)^2 + \frac{1}{4} (1 + \lambda_1)^2 \right] = \frac{1}{2} u'' \cdot (1 + \lambda_1^2). \quad (26)$$

This proves the first part of Proposition 1. From (6), we know

$$u'(c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta)) = V_1'(w_1) \quad \text{with} \quad w_1 = \Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta). \quad (27)$$

Taking a partial derivative with respect to  $\Delta$ , we have

$$\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{1}{2} (1 + \lambda_1^2) (1 - \phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}) = \frac{\frac{1}{2} (1 + \lambda_1^2)}{1 + \frac{1}{2} (1 + \lambda_1^2)} \quad (28)$$

This proves the second part of Proposition 1.

# A Online Appendix A: Other Proofs (Online Appendix Only)

**A generalization of Proposition 1.** Consider the more general specification of  $t = 1$  consumption rule in (10). Based on (7), we have

$$V_1'(w_1) = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \lambda_1) u' \left( \frac{1}{2}(1 - \lambda_1) w_1 - \bar{\lambda}_1 \right) + \frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_1) u' \left( \frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_1) w_1 + \bar{\lambda}_1 \right).$$

Because  $u$  is quadratic, we know that  $V_1''$  shares the same formula as (26). As a result,  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  shares the same formula as (28). Proposition 1 again follows. This explains that the key to the high-MPC result is mistakes in the future consumption's response to saving changes,  $\lambda_1$ .

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Based on each self's actual consumption rules  $\{c_t(w_t)\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$ , I can define the value function  $V_t(w_t)$  as a function of the current state,  $w_t$ , for each  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ ,

$$V_t(w_t) \equiv u(c_t(w_t)) + \sum_{k=1}^{T-t-1} \delta^k u(c_{t+k}(w_{t+k})) + \delta^{T-t} v(w_T), \quad (29)$$

subject to the budget in (13). For the last period  $T$ , we have  $V_T(w_T) = v(w_T)$ . Given (29), each self  $t$ 's deliberate consumption rule defined in (14) satisfies

$$c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t) = \arg \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \delta V_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t)). \quad (30)$$

Moreover, for  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ , the value function  $V_t(w_t)$  defined in (29) satisfies

$$V_t(w_t) = u(c_t(w_t)) + \delta V_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t(w_t))). \quad (31)$$

Note that because I assume  $u$ ,  $v$ , and  $c_t$  are third-order continuously differentiable,  $V_t$  is third-order continuously differentiable too.

The optimal deliberate consumption now is given by<sup>20</sup>

$$u'(c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)) = R \delta V_{t+1}'(R(w_t - c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t))). \quad (32)$$

---

<sup>20</sup>This equation imposes the concavity of the continuation value  $V_{t+1}(w_{t+1})$ . This is true around the path  $\{\bar{w}_t, \bar{c}_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$  because  $V_{t+1}''(\bar{w}_{t+1}) = u''(\bar{c}_{t+1}) \cdot \Gamma_{t+1} < 0$ , as proved below.

We henceforth have:

$$u''(c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)) \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} = R^2 \delta \left( 1 - \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} \right) V_{t+1}''(\bar{w}_{t+1}),$$

where  $\bar{w}_{t+1} = R(\bar{w}_t - \bar{c}_t) = R(\bar{w}_t - c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t))$  and

$$\frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} = \frac{R^2 \delta V_{t+1}''(\bar{w}_{t+1})}{u''(c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)) + R^2 \delta V_{t+1}''(\bar{w}_{t+1})}. \quad (33)$$

From (31):

$$V_t'(w_t) = \frac{\partial c_t(w_t)}{\partial w_t} u'(c_t(w_t)) + \left( 1 - \frac{\partial c_t(w_t)}{\partial w_t} \right) \delta R V_{t+1}'(w_{t+1}), \quad (34)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} V_t''(\bar{w}_t) &= \left( \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} \right)^2 u''(c_t(\bar{w}_t)) + \left( 1 - \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} \right)^2 \delta R^2 V_{t+1}''(\bar{w}_{t+1}), \\ &+ \frac{\partial^2 c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t^2} \left[ u'(c_t(\bar{w}_t)) - \delta R V_{t+1}'(\bar{w}_{t+1}) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

At  $\bar{w}_t$ , because  $c_t(\bar{w}_t) = c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t) = \bar{c}_t$ , from (32), we have  $u'(c_t(\bar{w}_t)) = \delta R V_{t+1}'(\bar{w}_{t+1})$ . As a result,

$$V_t''(\bar{w}_t) = \left( \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} \right)^2 u''(c_t(\bar{w}_t)) + \left( 1 - \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} \right)^2 \delta R^2 V_{t+1}''(\bar{w}_{t+1}). \quad (35)$$

Define  $\Gamma_t \equiv V_t''(\bar{w}_t) / u''(c_t(\bar{w}_t))$ ,  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t}$ , and

$$\phi_t \equiv \frac{\partial c_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t} = (1 - \lambda_t) \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}. \quad (36)$$

From (33) and (35), we have

$$\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}} \quad (37)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
\Gamma_t &= \phi_t^2 + (1 - \phi_t)^2 \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \\
&= (1 - \lambda_t)^2 \frac{\left( \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \right)^2}{\left( 1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \right)^2} + \left( \frac{1 + \lambda_t \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}} \right)^2 \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \\
&= \frac{\left( \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \right)^2}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}} \lambda_t^2 + \frac{\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}}. \tag{38}
\end{aligned}$$

We know  $\Gamma_{t+1}$  and  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with  $\{\lambda_{t+k}\}_{k=1}^{T-t-1}$  for all  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ . Proposition 2 then follows.

**Proof of Corollary 1.** For the pre-shock ( $\bar{\Delta} = 0$ ) outcome, from (15), we have

$$u'(\bar{c}_t) = \delta R u'(\bar{c}_{t+1}).$$

As a result, for all  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ ,

$$\frac{\bar{c}_{t+1}}{\bar{c}_t} = (\delta R)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}. \tag{39}$$

Substituting it into (37) and (38), we have

$$\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} (\delta R)^{-\frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma}}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} (\delta R)^{-\frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma}}} = \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \Gamma_{t+1}}{1 + \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \Gamma_{t+1}} \tag{40}$$

and

$$\Gamma_t = \frac{\left( \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \Gamma_{t+1} \right)^2}{1 + \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \Gamma_{t+1}} \lambda_t^2 + \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \Gamma_{t+1}}{1 + \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \Gamma_{t+1}} \equiv f(\Gamma_{t+1}),$$

with

$$f(x) \equiv \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x}{1 + \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x} + \frac{\left( \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x \right)^2}{1 + \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x} \lambda^2 = \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x}{1 + \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x} \left( 1 + \lambda^2 \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} x \right).$$

We also know that  $\Gamma_T = \frac{v''(\bar{w}_T)}{u''(\bar{c}_T)} = \kappa > 0$ , where I use  $\bar{w}_T = \bar{c}_T$ .

Let  $\Gamma = \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} - 1}{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \left[ 1 - \left( \delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \right) \lambda^2 \right]}$  denote the fixed point of  $f$ . That is  $f(\Gamma) = \Gamma$ . Moreover,

as long as  $\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} > 1$  and  $|\lambda| < \left(\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ , we have  $\Gamma > f(x) > x$  if  $0 < x < \Gamma$ ; and  $\Gamma < f(x) < x$  if  $x > \Gamma$ . We then have two cases:

1) If  $\Gamma > \kappa$ . We have  $\Gamma > \Gamma_0 = f^T(\kappa) > f^{(T-1)}(\kappa) > \dots > \kappa = \Gamma_T$ . As a result,  $\Gamma_0 = f^T(\kappa)$  converges to the fixed point  $\Gamma$  when  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ .

2) If  $\Gamma < \kappa$ . We have  $\Gamma < \Gamma_0 = f^T(\kappa) < f^{(T-1)}(\kappa) < \dots < \kappa = \Gamma_T$ . As a result,  $\Gamma_0 = f^T(\kappa)$  converges to the fixed point  $\Gamma$  when  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ .

Together, one way or another, as long as  $\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} > 1$  and  $|\lambda| < \left(\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ ,  $\Gamma_0 \rightarrow \Gamma$  when  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ . From (40), we have, when  $T \rightarrow +\infty$ ,

$$\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \rightarrow \phi^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} - 1}{\delta^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} R^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (1 - \lambda^2)}.$$

**Proof of Proposition 3.** Based on (7) and (21), we have

$$\begin{aligned} V_1'(w_1; \bar{\lambda}_1) &= \frac{1}{2} u' \left( \frac{1}{2} w_1 - \bar{\lambda}_1 \right) + \frac{1}{2} u' \left( \frac{1}{2} w_1 + \bar{\lambda}_1 \right) \\ \frac{\partial V_1'(w_1; \bar{\lambda}_1)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1} &= -\frac{1}{2} u'' \left( \frac{1}{2} w_1 - \bar{\lambda}_1 \right) + \frac{1}{2} u'' \left( \frac{1}{2} w_1 + \bar{\lambda}_1 \right) \\ \frac{\partial^2 V_1'(w_1; \bar{\lambda}_1)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2} &= \frac{1}{2} u''' \left( \frac{1}{2} w_1 - \bar{\lambda}_1 \right) + \frac{1}{2} u''' \left( \frac{1}{2} w_1 + \bar{\lambda}_1 \right). \end{aligned}$$

We have

$$\frac{\partial V_1'(w_1; 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 V_1'(w_1; 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2} > 0. \quad (41)$$

Based on (6) and (7), we have

$$\begin{aligned} u'(c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1)) &= V_1'(\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1); \bar{\lambda}_1), \\ u''(c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1)) \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1} &= -V_1''(\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1); \bar{\lambda}_1) \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1} \\ &\quad + \frac{\partial V_1'(\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; \bar{\lambda}_1); \bar{\lambda}_1)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1}. \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

Together with (41), we have

$$\frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial V_1'(\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; 0); 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1}}{u''(c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; 0)) + V_1''(\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\Delta; 0); 0)} = 0.$$

and

$$u'' \left( c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0) \right) \frac{\partial^2 c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2} = -V_1'' \left( \Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0); 0 \right) \frac{\partial^2 c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2} + \frac{\partial^2 V_1' (\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0); 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2}.$$

As a result,

$$\frac{\partial^2 c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2} = \frac{\frac{\partial^2 V_1' (\Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0); 0)}{\partial \bar{\lambda}_1^2}}{u'' \left( c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0) \right) + V_1'' \left( \Delta - c_0^{\text{Deliberate}} (\Delta; 0); 0 \right)} < 0.$$

This proves Proposition 3.

## B Online Appendix B: Additional Results

### B.1 Partial Sophistication and the Role of Perceived Dynamic Inconsistency

The main analysis can accommodate a more general interpretation if I re-define deliberate consumption (14) based on current self 0's perceived future consumption rules  $\{\tilde{c}_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ . That is, for  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ ,

$$c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t) \equiv \arg \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \sum_{k=1}^{T-t-1} \delta^k u(\tilde{c}_{t+k}(w_{t+k})) + \delta^{T-t} v(w_T), \quad (43)$$

subject to the budget (13). Future  $\{c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  can then be interpreted as the consumption that self 0 thinks is optimal at each future period  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ , given utility (11) and her perceived future consumption rules  $\{\tilde{c}_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ .

I can then define self 0's perceived future mistakes  $\{\tilde{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  as how her perceived future consumption rules  $\{\tilde{c}_t(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  deviate from what she deems optimal  $\{c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ . Specifically, similar to Proposition 1, I impose that perceived mistakes in future consumption only take the form of mistakes in response to saving changes, while there are no mistakes in the absence of the shock  $\Delta$ . That is, there are sequences  $\{\bar{c}_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$  and  $\{\bar{w}_t\}_{t=0}^T$  such that

$$(15) \text{ holds and } \tilde{c}_t(\bar{w}_t) = \bar{c}_t \quad \forall t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}. \quad (44)$$

We can then define self 0's perceived future mistakes in response to saving changes  $\{\tilde{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  similar

to (16):

$$\tilde{\phi}_t = \left(1 - \tilde{\lambda}_t\right) \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} \quad \forall t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}, \quad (45)$$

where  $\tilde{\phi}_t \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{c}_t(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t}$  and  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_t)}{\partial w_t}$ . We can then re-state Proposition 2 as how self 0's perceived future mistakes  $\left\{\tilde{\lambda}_t\right\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  increase the current MPC,  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$ .

**Corollary 2.** *Based on the definition in (43),  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_0)}{\partial w_0}$  increases with perceived future mistakes  $\left|\tilde{\lambda}_t\right|$  for each  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ , as long as (44) holds.*

From this reinterpretation, the key to the high-MPC result is: the current self thinks that her future consumption will deviate from what she deems optimal. In other words, the essence is a form of *perceived dynamic inconsistency*. For the specific behavioral foundations considered in Section 5, such dynamic inconsistency can come from two sources. First, perceived differences in different selves' decision utility (such as present bias Corollaries 7 and 8). Second, violations of the law of iterated expectations (such as versions of inattention and diagnostic expectations in Corollaries 4 – 6).

One important example of how perceived future mistakes are determined is the case of partial sophistication as in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001). That is, the current self has a partial understanding of future mistakes, and her perceived future mistake at  $t$  is given by:

$$\tilde{\lambda}_t = s\lambda_t, \quad (46)$$

where  $s \in [0, 1]$  captures current self 0's degree of sophistication. There are two immediate lessons. First, partial sophistication suffices for all qualitative results about how future mistakes increase current MPCs. Second, current MPCs increase with the degree of sophistication.

**Corollary 3.** *With (46),  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with current self 0's degree of sophistication  $s$ .*

**Proof of Corollary 2 and Corollary 3.** The proof of Proposition 2 goes through exactly, with perceived future mistakes  $\tilde{\lambda}_t$  replacing the role of actual future mistakes  $\lambda_t$ . Corollary 2 then follows. Corollary 3 then follows directly from Corollary 2 and (46).

## B.2 Robustness Checks for the Numerical Illustration

Here, I conduct robustness checks with other parameterizations of the numerical exercise described in Section 4.

In Figure 2, I first consider a higher relative degree of risk aversion  $\gamma = 2$ , while keeping other parameters constant. We can see that the deliberate MPC is still very similar to the one calculated

analytically in Corollary 1. The main lesson on how future mistakes in response to saving changes increase the current MPC is unchanged.




Figure 2: Robustness Checks:  $\gamma = 2$ .

In Figure 3, I then consider a higher return on saving  $R = 1.07$ , while keeping other parameters constant. We can see that the deliberate MPC is still very similar to the one calculated analytically in Corollary 1. The main lesson on how future mistakes in response to saving changes increase the current MPC is unchanged.




Figure 3: Robustness Checks:  $R = 1.07$ .

In Figure 4, I then consider a higher discount factor  $\delta = 0.93$ , while keeping other parameters constant. We can see that the deliberate MPC is still very similar to the one calculated analytically

in Corollary 1. The main lesson on how future mistakes in response to saving changes increase the current MPC is unchanged.




Figure 4: Robustness Checks:  $\delta = 0.93$ .

### B.3 The Precautionary Saving Motive and MPCs

A natural question is whether the precautionary saving motive driven by future mistakes in overall consumption level can also impact current MPCs. To illustrate this, consider the same environment as in Figure 1, with  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ ;  $\gamma = 1.1$ ;  $\sigma = 1$ ;  $\delta = 0.902$ ;  $R = 1.04$ ; and  $\underline{a} = 0$ . Instead of mistakes in response to saving changes in (18), I focus on mistakes in the overall consumption level  $\{\bar{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ . Specifically, similar to (21), these mistakes take the form of an additive deviation from the deliberate counterpart,

$$c_t(x_t) = \min \left\{ -\frac{a}{R} + x_t, c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(x_t - \bar{\lambda}_t) \right\},$$

which makes sure the consumer will not violate her borrowing constraints despite her mistakes. As in Figure 1, with uncertainty, it is easier to write the actual consumption rule as a function of cash on hand  $x_t$ . When  $\bar{\lambda}_t > 0$ , self  $t$ 's under-consumes (even in absence of the shock  $\Delta$ ). When  $\bar{\lambda}_t < 0$ , self  $t$ 's over-consumes. From Figure 5, we can see this type of additive future mistakes in overall consumption levels  $\{\bar{\lambda}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  effectively does not matter for the current MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$ .<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup>In Figure 5, the  $x$ -axis is  $\bar{\lambda}_t$  (in the unit of the standard deviation of the income risk  $\sigma = 1$ ).




Figure 5: Gradual Resolution of Uncertainty.

In applications, the essentially only possibility that future mistakes in overall consumption levels are large enough to matter for MPCs in (23) is that these mistakes take a multiplicative form

$$c_t(w_t) = c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}((1 - \Lambda_t)w_t), \quad (47)$$

where  $\Lambda_t \neq 0$  captures self  $t$ 's mistake. In this case, mistakes in overall consumption level can be very large: at  $w_t$ , self  $t$  behaves as if her wealth level were  $(1 - \Lambda_t)w_t$ , which can deviate significantly from  $w_t$  if  $\Lambda_t$  is away from zero. The precautionary saving motive due to those future mistakes can be large, which can impact MPCs nontrivially. Below, I provide a thorough analysis of this case. When the utility function is not that concave ( $\text{EIS} > 1$ ), the high-MPC channel focused in the paper in Proposition 2 still dominates and future mistakes still unambiguously lead to high MPCs. When the utility function is very concave ( $\text{EIS} < 1$ ), the precautionary saving channel may dominate.

## B.4 Combined Multiplicative Mistakes

In some popular behavioral foundations, mistakes in response to saving changes come together with mistakes in the overall consumption level. The most classical example is the plain-vanilla version of hyperbolic discounting without commitment devices. In a homothetic case, such a combined mistake take a multiplicative form. This allows me to provide a sharp characterization on how such “combined” mistakes impact current MPCs.

Specifically, let the utility be given by the CRRA form with  $u(c) = v(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ . In this homothetic case, the frictionless consumption rule will be a multiple of the wealth  $w_t$ . Consider

the case that the actual consumption rules inherit this property: for  $t \in \{0, \dots, T-1\}$ ,

$$c_t(w_t) = \Phi_t w_t \quad \text{and} \quad c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t) = \Phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} w_t, \quad (48)$$

where, similar to (16), self  $t$ 's mistake  $\Lambda_t$  is given by

$$\Phi_t = (1 - \Lambda_t) \Phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}, \quad (49)$$

where  $c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)$  are defined based on Definition 1 as usual. In the homothetic environment here, future mistake  $\Lambda_t$  takes a multiplicative as in (47) and plays a dual role. When  $\Lambda_t > 0$ , self  $t$  both under-consumes overall and under-reacts to changes in  $w_t$ . When  $\Lambda_t < 0$ , self  $t$  both over-consumes overall and over-reacts to changes in  $w_t$ . In other words,  $\Lambda_t$  combines mistakes in response to saving changes with mistakes in the overall consumption level.

I can now study how these ‘‘combined’’ future mistakes  $\{\Lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  impact the current consumption  $c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_0)$ . In the homothetic environment here,  $\Phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  in (48) also plays a dual role. It determines both the current MPC and the overall current consumption level. Future mistakes’ impact on  $\Phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  then combines the high-MPC effect in Proposition 2 and the low-consumption-level effect in Proposition 3.

**Proposition 4.** (1) When  $\gamma < 1$ ,  $\Phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with the future mistake  $|\Lambda_t|$  in a neighborhood of  $\Lambda_t = 0$  for each  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ .

(2) When  $\gamma > 1$ ,  $\Phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  decreases with the future mistake  $|\Lambda_t|$  in a neighborhood of  $\Lambda_t = 0$  for each  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ .

When the utility function is not that concave ( $\gamma < 1$ ), the high-MPC channel in Proposition 2, which pushes  $\Phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  higher, dominates the precautionary saving channel in Proposition 3, which pushes  $\Phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  lower. When the utility function is very concave ( $\gamma > 1$ ), the precautionary saving channel in Proposition 3, which pushes  $\Phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  lower, dominates.<sup>22</sup>

**Proof of Proposition 4.** I guess and verify the continuation value function defined in (29) takes the form of

$$V_t(w_t) = \kappa_t \frac{w_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

---

<sup>22</sup>One may wonder how to reconcile Proposition 4 with Figure 5, where the precautionary saving motive does not matter much for the MPC. Note that, in Figure 5, as the rest of the paper, mistakes in overall consumption level take the form of an ‘‘additive’’ deviation from the deliberate counterpart, similar to (21). Figure 5 shows that the precautionary saving motive driven by those types of mistakes is unlikely to matter for the MPC. On the other hand, mistakes in (49) take a multiplicative form. It leads to large deviations from the deliberation counterpart and large precautionary saving motives in Proposition 4.

for  $t \in \{0, \dots, T\}$ . I work with backward induction. At  $T$ , I have:

$$V_T(w_T) = \frac{w_T^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \quad \text{and} \quad \kappa_T = 1.$$

For each  $t \leq T-1$ , from (32), the deliberate consumption is given by

$$\begin{aligned} (c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t))^{-\gamma} &= \delta R \kappa_{t+1} (R(w_t - c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)))^{-\gamma} \\ \Phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} &= \frac{(\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \end{aligned} \quad (50)$$

From (49), the actual consumption is given by

$$\Phi_t = \frac{(1 - \Lambda_t) (\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}.$$

From the recursive formulation of the value function in (31), we have:

$$\kappa_t = \left( (1 - \Lambda_t) \frac{(\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^{1-\gamma} + \delta \kappa_{t+1} R^{1-\gamma} \left( 1 - (1 - \Lambda_t) \frac{(\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa_{t+1})^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^{1-\gamma}.$$

Define

$$f(\Lambda, \kappa) \equiv \left( (1 - \Lambda) \frac{(\delta \kappa)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^{1-\gamma} + \delta \kappa R^{1-\gamma} \left( 1 - (1 - \Lambda) \frac{(\delta \kappa)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right)^{1-\gamma}.$$

We have

$$\frac{\partial f(\Lambda, \kappa)}{\partial \Lambda} = -(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{1-\gamma} (1 - \Lambda)^{-\gamma} + (1 - \gamma) \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}} \delta \kappa R^{1-\gamma} (1 - (1 - \Lambda) \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-\gamma},$$

where

$$\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{(\delta \kappa)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 + (\delta \kappa)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} (R)^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \in (0, 1). \quad (51)$$

Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial^2 f(\Lambda, \kappa)}{\partial \Lambda^2} = -\gamma(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{1-\gamma} (1 - \Lambda)^{-\gamma-1} - \gamma(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^2 \delta \kappa R^{1-\gamma} (1 - (1 - \Lambda) \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-\gamma-1}.$$

Together with (51), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial f(0, \kappa)}{\partial \Lambda} &= -(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \gamma) \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}} \delta \kappa R^{1-\gamma} (1 - \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-\gamma} = 0 \\
\frac{\partial^2 f(0, \kappa)}{\partial \Lambda^2} &= -\gamma(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{1-\gamma} - \gamma(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^2 \delta \kappa R^{1-\gamma} (1 - \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-\gamma-1} \\
&= -\gamma(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{2-\gamma} \left[ (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-1} + (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^\gamma \delta \kappa R^{1-\gamma} (1 - \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-\gamma-1} \right] \\
&= -\gamma(1 - \gamma) (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{2-\gamma} \left[ (\Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-1} + (1 - \Phi^{\text{Deliberate}})^{-1} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

So

$$\frac{\partial^2 f(0, \kappa)}{\partial \Lambda^2} > 0 \iff \gamma > 1.$$

Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial f(0, \kappa)}{\partial \kappa} > 0.$$

Together, this means

1. When  $\gamma < 1$ ,  $\kappa_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  decreases with mistake  $|\Lambda_{t+k}|$  in a neighborhood of  $\Lambda_{t+k} = 0$  for each  $k \in \{0, \dots, T - t - 1\}$ .
2. When  $\gamma > 1$ ,  $\kappa_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with mistake  $|\Lambda_{t+k}|$  in a neighborhood of  $\Lambda_{t+k} = 0$  for each  $k \in \{0, \dots, T - t - 1\}$ .

Together with (50), we arrive at Proposition 4.

## B.5 Inattention

Based on the perceived  $w_t^p(w_t)$  in (24), the actual consumption rule for each self  $t \in \{0, \dots, T - 1\}$  is given by

$$c_t(w_t) = \arg \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \delta V_{t+1}(R(w_t^p(w_t) - c_t)), \quad (52)$$

where the continuation value function  $V_{t+1}$  is defined as in (29). To isolate the impact of future inattention on current consumption, the deliberate consumption is defined as in (30). As a corollary of Proposition 2, future consumption mistakes in the form of inattention lead to higher current MPCs.

**Corollary 4.**  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with future selves' degrees of inattention  $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  if the default wealth  $w_t^d$  is the pre-shock value  $\bar{w}_t$  for all  $t$ .

In the inattention case studied in Corollary 4, each self's perceived  $w_t$  is given by a deterministic weighted average between the actual  $w_t$  and the default. This follows the sparsity approach in

Gabaix (2014). An alternative way to model inattention is through noisy signals (Sims, 2003). These two approaches will lead to similar predictions on MPCs.

Specifically, it's well known that one needs linear consumption rules (quadratic utility) and Normally distributed fundamentals to obtain tractability with noisy signals. I hence consider the quadratic utility case of the problem set up in Section 3. I assume a Normally distributed exogenous shock, i.e.,  $\Delta \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ .<sup>23</sup> Unlike the main analysis, each self  $t$ 's knowledge of the current  $w_t$  is now summarized by a noisy signal  $x_t = w_t + \epsilon_t$ , while  $\epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\epsilon_t}^2)$  and is independent of  $\Delta$  and other  $\epsilon_t$ . In this case, each self understands that her signal is noisy and tries to infer her actual  $w_t$  from the signal.

$$E[w_t | x_t] = (1 - \lambda_t)x_t + \lambda_t \bar{w}_t, \quad (53)$$

where  $\lambda_t = \frac{\text{Var}(\epsilon_t)}{\text{Var}(w_t) + \text{Var}(\epsilon_t)} \in [0, 1]$  depends negatively on the signal-to-noise ratio of her signal about  $w_t$ .

Based on this signal, the actual consumption rule of each self  $t$  is given by

$$c_t(x_t) = \arg \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \delta E[V_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t)) | x_t], \quad (54)$$

where the continuation value function  $V_{t+1}$  is defined in (29) and the deliberate consumption is defined in (30), taking future selves' inattention to permanent income as given. The deliberate MPC is given by  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)}{\partial w_t}$ .<sup>24</sup> We have

**Corollary 5.** *Each self  $t$ 's deliberate MPC  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with future selves' degrees of inattention  $\{\lambda_{t+k}\}_{k=1}^{T-t-1}$ .*

As discussed in the main text, the essence of the high-MPC result is that the current self thinks that her future consumption will deviate from what she deems optimal. For the belief-based distortion considered in Corollaries 4 and 5, such perceived dynamic inconsistency comes in the form of violations of the law of iterated expectations. That is,

$$E_t[E_{t+1}[w_{t+1}]] \neq E_t[w_{t+1}], \quad (55)$$

where  $E_t[\cdot]$  captures self  $t$ 's belief. To see this, note that, in the sparsity case (24), we have  $E_t[w_{t+1}] = R(w_t^p - c_t)$  and  $E_t[E_{t+1}[w_{t+1}]] = R(1 - \lambda_{t+1})(w_t^p - c_t) + \lambda_{t+1}w_{t+1}^d$ , which leads to (55). In the noisy signal case,  $E_t[w_{t+1}] = R(E[w_t | x_t] - c_t)$  and  $E_t[E_{t+1}[w_{t+1}]] = R(1 - \lambda_{t+1})(E[w_t | x_t] - c_t) + \lambda_{t+1}\bar{w}_{t+1}$ , which leads to (55).

<sup>23</sup>This together with the linear actual consumption rule from (54) guarantees that each  $w_t$  is Normally distributed too.

<sup>24</sup>Since  $c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)$  is linear with quadratic utility,  $\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}$  does not depend on  $w_t$ .

This discussion also helps illustrate what forms of future inattention generate relevant mistakes that lead to higher current MPCs. To break law of iterated expectations, it is crucial that the latter self's information set does not nest the earlier self's information set. In other words, some forms of bounded recall is needed. The classical formulation of Rational Inattention (Sims, 2003), which maintains perfect recall and law of iterated expectations, will not generate relevant mistakes that lead to higher current MPCs. On the other hand, modern formulations of Rational Inattention incorporating bounded recall (Da Silveira, Sung and Woodford, 2020; Afrouzi et al., 2020) and the sparsity model studied above break law of iterated expectations and will generate relevant mistakes leading to higher current MPCs. For example, in the noisy signal case in Corollary 5, self  $t + 1$ 's information (summarized by  $x_{t+1}$ ) does not nest self  $t$ 's information  $x_t$ .

**Proof of Corollary 4.** From (24) and (52), we know the degree of inattention  $\lambda_t$  here corresponds to the degree of mistake in (16). Corollary 4 then follows from Proposition 2.

**Proof of Corollary 5.** The value in (31) is now given by

$$V_t(w_t) = \int [u(c_t(w_t + \epsilon_t)) + \delta V_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t(w_t + \epsilon_t)))] f_t(\epsilon_t) d\epsilon_t, \quad (56)$$

where  $f_t(\cdot)$  is the p.d.f. for  $\epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\epsilon_t}^2)$ . Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, I use  $\Gamma_t \equiv V_t''/u'' > 0$  to define the ‘‘concavity’’ of the continuation value function. From (30), the deliberate MPC is then given by

$$\phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}}.$$

From the actual consumption in (54), we have<sup>25</sup>

$$\phi_t = (1 - \lambda_t) \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_t) \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}}, \quad (57)$$

where From (56), we have

$$\frac{\partial V_t(w_t)}{\partial w_t} = \int \left[ \phi_t u'(c_t(w_t + \epsilon_t)) + (1 - \phi_t) \delta R \frac{\partial V_{t+1}(w_{t+1})}{\partial w_{t+1}} \right] f_t(\epsilon_t) d\epsilon_t,$$

---

<sup>25</sup>  $\phi_t \equiv \frac{\partial c_t(x_t)}{\partial x_t}$ . Since  $c_t(\cdot)$  is linear with quadratic utility,  $\phi_t$  does not depend on  $x_t$ .

where  $w_{t+1} = R(w_t - c_t(w_t + \epsilon_t))$ . The recursive formulation of  $\Gamma_t$  is then given by

$$\begin{aligned}\Gamma_t &= (\phi_t)^2 + (1 - \phi_t)^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \delta R^2 \\ &= \frac{(\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1})^2}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}} \lambda_t^2 + \frac{\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1}}.\end{aligned}$$

We have  $\Gamma_t$  increases in  $\{\lambda_{t+k}\}_{k=0}^{T-t-1}$ . Corollary 5 then follows.

## B.6 Diagnostic Expectations

To follow closely Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022), I use the three-period example with quadratic utility in Section 2. In the final period  $t = 2$ , as in (3), the consumer consumes out of all her remaining saving,  $c_2(w_2) = w_2$ . In the middle period  $t = 1$ , a higher saving  $w_1$  triggers more vivid memories of good times for the consumer, which leads her to become overly optimistic about  $c_2$ . On the other hand, a lower saving  $w_1$  triggers more vivid memories of bad times for the consumer, which leads her to become overly pessimistic about  $c_2$ . Mathematically, the consumer's consumption  $c_1(w_1)$  at  $t = 1$  is given by

$$u'(c_1(w_1)) = E_1^\theta [u'(c_2(w_2))], \quad (58)$$

where  $E_1^\theta[\cdot]$  captures her diagnostic expectation given by<sup>26</sup>

$$E_1^\theta [c_2(w_2)] = (1 + \theta) c_2(w_2), \quad (59)$$

and  $\theta > 0$  measures the degree of over-reaction in expectation, i.e., the representativeness distortion. Together, we have

$$c_1(w_1) = \frac{1 + \theta}{2 + \theta} w_1. \quad (60)$$

In other words, since the diagnostic expectation at  $t = 1$  about  $c_2$  over-reacts to saving changes in  $w_1$ , consumption  $c_1$  also over-reacts to saving changes. Based on (60), one can then define the deliberate consumption at  $t = 0$  as in (5). As a corollary to Proposition 1, future diagnostic expectations increase the current MPC.

**Corollary 6.** *The current MPC  $\phi_0^{Deliberate}$  strictly increases with the degree of future diagnostic expectations  $\theta$ .*

---

<sup>26</sup>The case studied here corresponds to the ‘‘distant memory’’  $J \geq 2$  case in Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022). That is, the reference point for  $E_1^\theta[\cdot]$  is invariant to the shock  $\Delta$  and decisions at  $t = 0$ . It is instead given by the pre-shock outcome  $\bar{c}_2 = \bar{w}_2 = 0$  in Section 2.

The result can also be easily extended to the concave case in Proposition 2. This is because di-agnostic expectations are precisely about belief over-reaction to shocks, while there are no mistakes in the overall expectations level. As a result, Proposition 2 applies.

As discussed in the main text, the essence of the high-MPC result is that the current self thinks that her future consumption will deviate from what she deems optimal. For the belief-based distortion considered in Corollary 6, such perceived dynamic inconsistency comes in the form of violations of the law of iterated expectations. From (59), we can see the violation easily:<sup>27</sup>

$$E_0^\theta [E_1^\theta [c_2(w_2)]] = (1 + \theta) E_0^\theta [c_2(w_2)] \neq E_0^\theta [c_2(w_2)].$$

**Proof of Corollary 6.** From (4) and (60), we know  $\lambda = -\frac{\theta}{2+\theta}$ . And Corollary 6 follows from Proposition 1.

## B.7 Hyperbolic Discounting

My framework can also accommodate hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Laibson, 1997; Barro, 1999; Angeletos et al., 2001; Harris and Laibson, 2001). Let me start with the case with commitment devices, e.g., the original Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001). This case only introduces mistakes in response to saving changes and will map to Proposition 2.

Specifically, the consumer can put her saving in illiquid assets with costly withdrawals to avoid over-consumption driven by the present bias. In absence of shocks, she can achieve optimal consumption through this commitment device. That is, (15) holds. On the other hand, in response to shocks, the commitment device no longer prevents her from consuming sub-optimally. In this case, a presently biased future self  $t$ 's consumption will be given by

$$c_t(w_t) = \bar{c}_t + 1 \cdot (w_t - \bar{w}_t), \tag{61}$$

for all  $w_t$  in a neighborhood of  $\bar{w}_t$ .<sup>28</sup>

Given (61), I can define the deliberate consumption rule  $c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)$  as usual. As a corollary of Proposition 2, mistakes in future consumption driven by future present biases will necessarily increase the current MPC.

---

<sup>27</sup>The “recent memory”  $J = 1$  case in Bianchi, Ilut and Saijo (2022) instead does not break law of iterated expectations and does not lead to perceived dynamic inconsistency. This is because, in this case, the reference point for  $E_1^\theta [c_t]$  moves with decisions at  $t = 0$ .

<sup>28</sup>To derive (61). First, consider a small positive deviation of  $w_t$  away from  $\bar{w}_t$ . Because  $u'(\bar{c}_t) = \delta V'(\bar{w}_{t+1})$ ,  $u'(\bar{c}_t) > \beta_t \delta V'(\bar{w}_{t+1})$  for all  $\beta_t < 1$ . As a result, present bias will prompt self  $t$  to consume out of all the positive deviation  $w_t - \bar{w}_t$  and (61) holds. Second, consider a small negative deviation of  $w_t$  away from  $\bar{w}_t$ . Because of the costly withdrawals from the illiquid assets, self  $t$  can only use  $c_t$  to absorb the negative deviation  $w_t - \bar{w}_t$  and (61) again holds.

**Corollary 7.** *Given any strictly concave utility functions  $u$  and  $v$ , (15), and the hyperbolic-discounting future consumption rules (61),  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_0)}{\partial w_0} \geq \phi_0^{\text{Frictionless}}$ , where  $\phi_0^{\text{Frictionless}}$  is the frictionless MPC at  $\bar{w}_0$ .*

Now let us turn to the plain vanilla beta-delta model without access to illiquid assets as a commitment device (Barro, 1999; Harris and Laibson, 2001). Here, hyperbolic discounting leads to both mistakes in response to saving changes and mistakes in overall consumption levels. Specifically, the actual future consumption rule of self  $t$  is given by

$$c_t(w_t) = \arg \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \delta \beta_t V_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t)), \quad (62)$$

where  $\beta_t \in [0, 1]$  captures self  $t$ 's present bias, which leads to both types of mistakes. Both the focused high-MPC channel in Proposition 2 (because of future mistakes in response to saving changes) and the precautionary saving channel in Proposition 3 (because of mistakes in overall consumption levels) are at force. With CRRA utility, this case maps to the multiplicative case in Proposition 4.

**Corollary 8.** *When  $u(x) = v(x) = \frac{x^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ , the hyperbolic discounting case in (62) is nested by Proposition 4. When  $\gamma < 1$ , the current MPC  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}}$  increases with future selves' present bias, i.e., decreases with each  $\{\beta_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ .*

Similar to the discussion after Proposition 4, when the utility function is not that concave (EIS > 1), the high-MPC channel focused in the paper in Proposition 2 dominates and future mistakes still unambiguously lead to high MPCs. When the utility function is very concave (EIS < 1), the precautionary saving channel may dominate. This is consistent with the result in Maxted (2022).

**Proof of Corollary 7.** This follows directly from (61) and Proposition 2.

**Proof of Corollary 8.** From (62), we have

$$u'(c_t(w_t)) = \delta \beta_t R V'_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t(w_t))). \quad (63)$$

From (30), we have

$$u'(c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)) = \delta R V'_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t))). \quad (64)$$

Comparing (63) and (64), we have:

$$\phi_t = \beta_t^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}}.$$

Corollary 8 then follows directly from Proposition 4.

## B.8 Stochastic Epsilon-mistakes

Here, we study stochastic mistakes that do not bias the consumer's response to saving changes in a particular way. That is,  $\lambda_t \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_t^2)$  in (16). Define the deliberate consumption  $c_t^{\text{Deliberate}}(w_t)$  as usual given (16). Similar to Proposition 2, future stochastic mistakes in response to saving changes lead to higher current MPCs.

**Corollary 9.** *If  $\lambda_t \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_t^2)$ ,  $\phi_0^{\text{Deliberate}} \equiv \frac{\partial c_0^{\text{Deliberate}}(\bar{w}_0)}{\partial w_0}$  increases with the variances in future selves' stochastic mistakes,  $\sigma_t^2$ , for  $t \in \{1, \dots, T-1\}$ ,*

This result means that, even if future consumption's response may be correct on average, stochastic mistakes in response to saving changes still increase current MPCs.

**Proof of Corollary 9.** This case is not directly nested in Proposition 2, as the actual consumption rule is stochastic. But the proof is essentially unchanged.

The value function in (31) is now given by

$$V_t(w_t) = E_t[u(c_t(w_t)) + \delta V_{t+1}(R(w_t - c_t(w_t)))],$$

where  $E_t[\cdot]$  averages over the potential realizations of  $\lambda$ s. The deliberate consumption in (30) is unchanged.

In the proof of Proposition 2, the deliberate MPC is still given by (37), but (38) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_t &= \mathbb{E}^{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} (1 - \lambda_t) \right)^2 + \left( 1 - \phi_t^{\text{Deliberate}} (1 - \lambda_t) \right)^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \delta R^2 \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \right] \\ &= \frac{\delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}} + \sigma_t^2 \frac{\left( \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)} \right)^2}{1 + \delta R^2 \Gamma_{t+1} \frac{u''(\bar{c}_{t+1})}{u''(\bar{c}_t)}}. \end{aligned}$$

As a result,  $\Gamma_t$  increases with  $\{\sigma_{t+k}^2\}_{k=0}^{T-t-1}$ . Corollary 9 then follows directly from (37).

## References

Afrouzi, Hassan, Spencer Yongwook Kwon, Augustin Landier, Yueran Ma, and David Thesmar. (2020) "Overreaction in expectations: Evidence and theory." *NBER Working Paper*.

- Allcott, Hunt, Joshua Kim, Dmitry Taubinsky, and Jonathan Zinman.** (2022) “Are high-interest loans predatory? Theory and evidence from payday lending.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 89(3): 1041–1084.
- Anderson, Siwan, and Jean-Marie Baland.** (2002) “The economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(3): 963–995.
- Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen Weinberg.** (2001) “The hyperbolic consumption model: Calibration, simulation, and empirical evaluation.” *Journal of Economic perspectives*, 15(3): 47–68.
- Ashraf, Nava.** (2009) “Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimental study in the Philippines.” *American Economic Review*, 99(4): 1245–77.
- Azaredo da Silveira, Rava, and Michael Woodford.** (2019) “Noisy memory and over-reaction to news.” *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 109: 557–61.
- Baicker, Katherine, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Joshua Schwartzstein.** (2015) “Behavioral hazard in health insurance.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(4): 1623–1667.
- Barro, Robert.** (1999) “Ramsey meets Laibson in the Neoclassical growth model.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4): 1125–1152.
- Bianchi, Francesco, Cosmin Ilut, and Hikaru Saijo.** (2022) “Diagnostic business cycles.” *Review of Economic Studies*.
- Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer.** (2018) “Diagnostic expectations and credit cycles.” *The Journal of Finance*, 73(1): 199–227.
- Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer.** (2020) “Overreaction in macroeconomic expectations.” *American Economic Review*, 110(9): 2748–82.
- Boutros, Michael.** (2022) “Windfall income shocks with finite planning horizons.” *Bank of Canada mimeo*.
- Browning, Martin, Francois Bourguignon, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, and Valerie Lechene.** (1994) “Income and outcomes: A structural model of intrahousehold allocation.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(6): 1067–1096.
- Carrera, Mariana, Heather Royer, Mark Stehr, Justin Sydnor, and Dmitry Taubinsky.** (2022) “Who chooses commitment? Evidence and welfare implications.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 89(3): 1205–1244.

- Carroll, Christopher.** (1997) “Buffer-stock saving and the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(1): 1–55.
- Carroll, Christopher, Martin Holm, and Miles Kimball.** (2021) “Liquidity constraints and precautionary saving.” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 195: 105276.
- Chetty, Raj, and Adam Szeidl.** (2007) “Consumption commitments and risk preferences.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(2): 831–877.
- Cochrane, John.** (1989) “The sensitivity of tests of the intertemporal allocation of consumption to near-Rational alternatives.” *The American Economic Review*, 319–337.
- Da Silveira, Rava Azeredo, Yeji Sung, and Michael Woodford.** (2020) “Optimally imprecise memory and biased forecasts.” *NBER Working Paper*.
- Duflo, Esther.** (2003) “Grandmothers and granddaughters: old-age pensions and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa.” *The World Bank Economic Review*, 17(1): 1–25.
- Duflo, Esther, and Christopher R Udry.** (2004) “Intrahousehold resource allocation in Cote d’Ivoire: Social norms, separate accounts and consumption choices.” *NBER Working Paper*.
- Fagereng, Andreas, Martin Holm, and Gisle Natvik.** (2021) “MPC heterogeneity and household balance sheets.” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 13(4): 1–54.
- Fagereng, Andreas, Martin Holm, Benjamin Moll, and Gisle Natvik.** (2021) “Saving behavior across the wealth distribution.” *University of Oslo mimeo*.
- Farhi, Emmanuel, and Xavier Gabaix.** (2020) “Optimal taxation with behavioral agents.” *American Economic Review*, 110(1): 298–336.
- Gabaix, Xavier.** (2014) “A sparsity-based model of bounded rationality.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4).
- Gabaix, Xavier.** (2016) “Behavioral macroeconomics via sparse dynamic programming.” *NBER Working Paper*.
- Ganong, Peter, and Pascal Noel.** (2019) “Consumer spending during unemployment: positive and normative implications.” *American Economic Review*, 109(7): 2383–2424.
- Harris, Christopher, and David Laibson.** (2001) “Dynamic choices of hyperbolic consumers.” *Econometrica*, 69(4): 935–957.

- Holm, Martin.** (2018) “Consumption with liquidity constraints: An analytical characterization.” *Economics Letters*, 167: 40–42.
- Ilut, Cosmin, and Rosen Valchev.** (2023) “Economic agents as imperfect problem solvers.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 138(1): 313–362.
- Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky.** (1972) “Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness.” *Cognitive Psychology*, 3(3): 430–454.
- Kimball, Miles.** (1990) “Precautionary saving in the small and in the large.” *Econometrica*, 58(1): 53–73.
- Kueng, Lorenz.** (2018) “Excess sensitivity of high-income consumers.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(4): 1693–1751.
- Laibson, David.** (1997) “Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(2): 443–478.
- Le Yaouanq, Yves, and Peter Schwardmann.** (2022) “Learning about one’s self.” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 20(5): 1791–1828.
- Lise, Jeremy, and Ken Yamada.** (2019) “Household sharing and commitment: Evidence from panel data on individual expenditures and time use.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(5): 2184–2219.
- Maćkowiak, Bartosz, and Mirko Wiederholt.** (2015) “Business cycle dynamics under rational inattention.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 82(4): 1502–1532.
- Mackowiak, Bartosz, Filip Matejka, and Mirko Wiederholt.** (2021) “Rational inattention: A review.” *Journal of Economic Literature*.
- Matejka, Filip.** (2016) “Rationally inattentive seller: Sales and discrete pricing.” *Review of Economic Studies*, 83(3): 1125–1155.
- Maxted, Peter.** (2022) “Present bias in consumption-saving models: A tractable continuous-time approach.”
- Mazzocco, Maurizio.** (2007) “Household intertemporal behaviour: A collective characterization and a test of commitment.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 74(3): 857–895.
- McDowall, Robert.** (2020) “Consumption behavior across the distribution of liquid assets.” *NYU mimeo*.

- Mullainathan, Sendhil.** (2002) “A Memory-based model of bounded rationality.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(3): 735–774.
- Mullainathan, Sendhil, Joshua Schwartzstein, and William Congdon.** (2012) “A reduced-form approach to behavioral public finance.” *Annual Review of Economics*, 4(1): 511–540.
- O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin.** (1999) “Doing it now or later.” *American Economic Review*, 89(1): 103–124.
- O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin.** (2001) “Choice and procrastination.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(1): 121–160.
- Olafsson, Arna, and Michaela Pagel.** (2018) “The liquid Hand-to-mouth: Evidence from personal finance management software.” *The Review of Financial Studies*, 31(11): 4398–4446.
- Parker, Jonathan.** (2017) “Why don’t households smooth consumption? Evidence from a 25 million Dollar experiment.” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 9(4): 153–83.
- Piccione, Michele, and Ariel Rubinstein.** (1997) “On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall.” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 20(1): 3–24.
- Shefrin, Hersh, and Richard Thaler.** (1988) “The behavioral life-cycle hypothesis.” *Economic Inquiry*, 26(4): 609–643.
- Sims, Christopher.** (2003) “Implications of rational inattention.” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 50(3): 665–690.
- Stephens, Melvin, and Takashi Unayama.** (2011) “The consumption response to seasonal income: Evidence from Japanese public pension benefits.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 86–118.
- Thaler, Richard.** (1990) “Anomalies: Saving, fungibility, and mental accounts.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4(1): 193–205.
- Thomas, Duncan.** (1990) “Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach.” *Journal of Human Resources*, 635–664.